32For a different analysis of this example, cf. Merely thinking of oneself as the subject of one’s thoughts does not amount to intuiting oneself as persisting in time; the latter is required, however, for application of the schematized category of substance. 48This is in line with Kant’s claim at A664/B692 that while the mathematical categories of quantity and quality are constitutive of intuition, the dynamical categories of relation and modality are constitutive of experience. As Friedman worries, this appears to entail that there was ‘no genuinely objective experience before Newton established the law of universal gravitation in the Principia …’ (2012: 262–63). Yet the distinction between objective and subjective validity is central to Kant’s account of experience and plays a key … In this activity, the faculty overlaps with the role Kant singles out for imagination in the section of the first Critique entitled ‘On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.’ Both are conceived of here in terms of the ultimate functioning of understanding, since it is understanding that generates concepts. It follows, then, that it is specifically the addition of a relational category that allows for a JOP to be ‘converted’ into a JOE.50 This is certainly the case with Kant’s own examples, which, as we have seen, involve adding the category of substance-inherence or the category of cause-and-effect. (reciprocity between agent and patient), Categories of Modality: Possibility--Impossibility, This concept is presumed to be one already possessed by the subject. Now, of course, Kant does agree with Hume on some crucial points. Note, however, that this is in contrast with my example of the rooster above, in which it was the JOP (3) ‘When I hear a rooster crow, I imagine the smell of coffee’ that seemed more natural than any JOE that would assert an objective connection between roosters and coffee (such as the false judgment that a rooster’s crowing causes the smell of coffee). The view that JOPs express empirically observed correlations of events and/or inductive generalizations based on such observations is shared by Friedman (2012: 247, 250), Wolff (2012: 132–35), and Beizaei (2017: 363–64). See CJ 5:212; 5:214, 5:217. Kant here makes a point similar to contemporary, functionalist accounts of the mind (see Meerbote (1991); Brook (1997)). order to constitute the objects of experience. 2009. Kant thus engages in a two-part strategy for explaining the possibility of such synthetic a priori knowledge. As I will explain, I believe Kant struggles to identify the correct way to formulate his examples so that they exhibit the features he ascribes to JOPs in the Prolegomena. For further discussion of the Second Analogy and its relation to Kant’s distinction, see §3.3 below. In the case of the former, he says: I do not at all require that I should find it so at every time, or that everyone else should find it just as I do; they express only a relation of two sensations to the same subject, namely myself, and this only in my present state of perception, and are therefore not expected to be valid for the object: these I call judgments of perception [Wahrnehmungsurteile] (4:299). See Allison (2015: 294–95). One of the core projects of Kant’s most famous work, the Critique of Pure Reason, is to provide an argument for the legitimacy of a priori knowledge of the natural world. As mentioned above, If we understand by ‘content’…a representation’s particular relation to an object…then it is clear that we should conclude that Kant accepts non-conceptual content. Let me pause here to consider the important question of whether Kant continues to allow for the possibility of JOPs by the time he writes the B-deduction. Schemata are needed by Kant Finally, there has been extensive discussion on the non-conceptuality of intuition in the secondary literature on Kant’s philosophy of mathematics. London: Palgrave Macmillan. same unity, namely the unity imposed by the faculty of rational On the other hand, it is not a purely passive faculty but rather engages in the activity of bringing together various representations, as does memory, for example, .Kant explicitly connects understanding with this kind of active mental processing. possibility of objects of experience themselves. For example, a subject quite obviously need not go through the procedure Longuenesse describes—viz., ‘confronting the correlations already obtained with many more, while perhaps also using the resources of mathematical construction’—simply in order to claim that the sun warms a stone.15.
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